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Abstract: Simple heuristics and regression models make different as-
sumptions about behaviour. Both the environment and judgment can be
described as fast and frugal. We do not know whether humans are suc-
cessful when being fast and frugal. We must assess both global accuracy
and the costs of Type I and II errors. These may be “smart heuristics that
make researchers look simple.”
Are humans really fast and frugal? Should humans be fast and fru-
gal? Human judgment may be described on a number of dimen-
sions such as the amount of information used and how it is inte-
grated. The choice of a model dictates how these dimensions are
characterised, irrespective of the data. For example, regression
models in judgment and decision-making research are linear and
compensatory, and researchers have assumed that humans are,
too (Cooksey 1996). The fast and frugal models proposed by
Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999) use few
cues and are often noncompensatory, assuming humans are, too.
Are humans really using less information in the fast and frugal
model than the regression model? People can chunk information
(e.g., Simon 1979). Regression models are characterised as com-
plex in terms of use of multiple cues, but they often contain few
significant cues (on average three; Brehmer 1994). This chal-
lenges the argument that fast and frugal models are more frugal
than regression models, at least in terms of the number of cues
searched. Unlike standard practice (Tabachnik & Fidell 1996), in
their regression analyses, Gigerenzer et al. retain nonsignificant
cue weights. A fairer test would compare fast and frugal models
against parsimonious regression models.
Regression models have been used to describe the relationship
between judgments and the cues (the judgment system), and the
relationship between outcomes and the cues (the environment
system; Cooksey 1996). In both cases the underlying structure of
the cues is similar (e.g., they are correlated). Fifteen years of ma-
chine learning research demonstrates that fast and frugal models
can describe environments (Dutton & Conroy 1996). It is not sur-
prising that these models should also be good at describing human
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judgment. Both types of models are useful for fitting data per se.
Chapter 7 demonstrates that fast and frugal models are good at
describing human judgment, under conditions of time pressure
with participants neither experienced nor familiar with the choice
task. At other points in the book, results of simulations seem to be
generalised with little justification to humans. However, research
has shown that fast and frugal models are valid descriptions of pro-
fessionals’ judgment behaviour in the legal and medical domains
(Dhami & Ayton 1998; Harries & Dhami 1998). So far we have
learned that the environment and humans can be described as fast
and frugal. We do not yet know whether humans are successful
when being fast and frugal because studies either don’t collect
judgments or don’t include outcomes.
We have doubts about the prescriptive utility of fast and frugal
models. The book argues (at least implicitly) that if fast and frugal
models are good at predicting the environment, then humans
should (and do) use these strategies to make accurate decisions.
However, in many situations global accuracy is not the first con-
cern: the two types of errors (Type I and Type II) are differentially
weighted. In medicine, for example, all tests involve a trade off
between Type I and Type II errors. Researchers developing
machine-learning models in this domain incorporate the costs of
the two types of error (Kukar et al., 1999). In criminal justice, the
opposing concepts of due process and of crime control attempt to
reduce crime whilst minimising different types of error (Type I–
the number of people falsely convicted and Type II–the number
of guilty people acquitted, respectively). It so happens that due
process expects a regression-like behaviour: all available informa-
tion is searched, weighted, and integrated. The fast and frugal
strategy of crime control emphasises information associated with
guilt, encouraging “conveyor belt justice.” Justice is synonymous
with due process, so the judge should behave like a regression
model. Of course, unlike medicine, the socially constructed nature
of criminal justice implies that we could change our notion of jus-
tice to one that reflects fast and frugal behaviour. Before Gigeren-
zer et al. encourage this we recommend that they evaluate mod-
els on other criteria in addition to global accuracy. In sum, the
descriptive success of simple heuristics does not, of itself, imply
their prescriptive utility.
On a differing point, if we do find that fast and frugal models
have prescriptive utility, their potential as cognitive aids or in cog-
nitive feedback vastly outweighs that of regression models (which
have done pretty well; Cooksey 1996). Fast and frugal models are
easy to understand and to apply while regression models are dif-
ficult to use without an aid and without knowing the range of cases
on which they were formed.
In short, we welcome fast and frugal models because they make
us re-think the dimensions of human judgment. The danger is that
they will be automatically adopted as tools to describe human
judgment, like regression models have been for 50 years. All mod-
els are paramorphic not isomorphic. So, we should be wary of
“smart heuristics that make researchers look simple.”
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